# Novel threat modes in LLM attacks and failure modes in LLM defenses

#### **BENGAL Proposer's Day Lightning Talk**

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
- Objective one:
  - Novel threat mode in the study of LLMs: Durable backdoor attacks on LLMs
  - Preventing LLMs from generating toxic outputs
- Objective two:
  - Novel threat mode in the study of LLMs: Teach LLMs to phish
  - Mitigating hazardous use of LLMs by potential adversaries
- Objective three:
  - <u>LLM defense scheme</u>: an analytical framework based on model diagnostics
  - Utilizing the varying training quality to design a divide-and-conquer defense



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


 Using poisoned updates to implant socalled backdoors into the LLM

Zhang\*, Panda\*, Song, Yang, Mahoney, Mittal, Ramchandran & Gonzalez. Neurotoxin: Durable Backdoors in Federated Learning. ICML 2022.



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


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
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
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
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
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


## **Three objectives**

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
#### • A novel attack scheme to extract private information from LLMs




• A three-phase attack



#### • A novel attack scheme to extract private information from LLMs




Phase-II (Fine tuning): Model memorizes secret because it was "taught to phish".




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


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




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
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
- A three-phase attack
- Given prior information about the text preceding the secret, one can perfectly extract 80% of 12 digit secrets



#### A novel attack scheme to extract private information from LLMs



- A three-phase attack
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- Scaling laws: larger LLMs trained using more data are easier to attack






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#### An analytical framework based on model diagnostics

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


Yang, Hodgkinson, Theisen, Zou, Gonzalez, Gonzalez, Ramchandran, & Mahoney. Taxonomizing local versus global structure in neural network loss landscapes. NeurIPS 2021.



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Hyperparameter configurations may have "phase transitions".

The training quality can be analyzed through the optimization landscape.

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Different rounds of data from TrojAI may have different training gualities.

round-3


round-4

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#### An analytical framework based on model diagnostics

• Different failure modes of AI models



Zhou, Chen, Cao, Schürholt, Mahoney & Yang. Why do landscape diagnostics matter? Pinpointing the failure mode of generalization. Ongoing work. 2023.

# Thank you!

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